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Philosophy, Wittgenstein said, ‘leaves everything as it is’. It sounds like a complaint, but actually it was a 
recommendation. Philosophy at its best, 
Wittgenstein thought, resists the scientific 
impulse to treat the world as a theoretical 
construct. It is not a view shared in the 
main by contemporary philosophers. What 
is philosophy supposed to do if not theor­
ise? At the same time most philosophers 
are happy to leave everything as it is in a 
more prosaic sense: that is, by not really 
changing anything. Philosophers may talk 
about justice or rights, but they don’t often 
try to reshape the world according to their 
ideals. Maybe that’s for the best. Philo­
sophers have a tendency to slip from sense 
into seeming absurdity: a defence of abort­
ion ends up defending infanticide; an argu­
ment for vegetarianism turns into a call 
 for the extermination of wild carnivores. 
A new generation of moral philosophers 
is determined to break with this tradition 
of ineffectuality. The goal of the ‘effective 
altruists’ is not only to theorise the world, 
but to use their theories to leave the world 
a better place than they found it. Their 
leader is William MacAskill, a 28­year­old 
lecturer at Oxford. As graduate students 
MacAskill and his friend Toby Ord commit­
ted themselves to donate most of their fut­
ure earnings to charity (in MacAskill’s case 
anything above £20,000, in Ord’s £18,000), 
and set themselves the task of figuring out 
how to make best use of the money they 
had pledged. The result was Giving What 
We Can, a charity that encourages people 
to hand over at least 10 per cent of their 
 future incomes for philanthropic purposes, 
and advises them on how to get the most 
out of their money. Since the charity was 
founded in 2009 it has received more than 
$400 million in pledges, much of it from 
young philosophers. In 2011, MacAskill set 
up 80,000 Hours (the name refers to the 
number of hours the average person works 
over a lifetime), a charity that helps people 
make career choices with the aim of maxi­
mising social benefit; it raised eyebrows 
early on by advising graduates to become 
philanthropic bankers rather than NGO 
workers. The two organisations are incorp­
orated as the Centre for Effective Altruism, 
based in Oxford, and are in the van of a 
global movement, encompassing groups 
such as GiveWell (founded by two hedge­
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fund managers at around the same time as 
MacAskill and Ord started their work), The 
Life You Can Save (founded by the philoso­
pher Peter Singer), Good Ventures (found­
ed by the Facebook cofounder Dustin Mos k­
ovitz and his wife, Cari Tuna, who have 
pledged to give away most of their money), 
Animal Charity Evaluators (an 80,000 Hours 
spin­off ) and the Open Philanthropy Pro­
ject (a collaboration between GiveWell and 
Good Ventures).
In Doing Good Better, MacAskill sets out 
the thinking behind effective altruism. His 
main claim, familiar from the utilitarian trad­
ition out of which the movement emerges, 
is that we should seek not only to do good, 
but to do the most good we can. To do that 
we need empirical research – research his 
organisations provide – into the amount of 
good created by various different charities, 
types of consumption, careers and so on. 
MacAskill proposes that ‘good’, here, can be 
understood roughly in terms of quality­ 
adjusted life­years (Qalys), a unit that allows 
welfare economists to compare benefits of 
very different sorts. One Qaly is a single 
year of life lived at 100 per cent health. Ac­
cording to a standardised scale, a year as an 
Aids patient not on antiretrovirals is worth 
0.5 Qalys; a year with Aids lived on anti­
retrovirals is worth 0.9 Qalys. A year of life 
for a blind person is worth 0.4 Qalys; a year 
of life as a non­blind, otherwise healthy 
person is worth 1 Qaly. (These numbers are 
based on self­reporting by Aids patients and 
blind people, which raises some obvious 
worries. For example, dialysis patients rate 
their lives at 0.56 Qalys – significantly high­
er than the 0.39 Qalys predicted by people 
who don’t need dialysis. Maybe this is be­
cause dialysis isn’t as bad as we think. Or 
maybe it’s because dialysis is so awful that 
you forget just how much better your life 
was without it.) To calculate whether, given 
the choice, it would be better to cure the 
blind person or improve the life of the Aids 
patient, you must take into account the in­
crease in both life quality and life expectancy 
that would be caused by the intervention. 
Giving a 40­year­old Aids patient antiretro­
virals would give her a 40 per cent jump in 
life quality (from 50 per cent to 90 per cent) 
for five years, and also would give her an ad­
ditional five years of life at 90 per cent, for 
a total of 6.5 Qalys ((0.4 x 5) + (0.9 x 5) = 
6.5). Curing a blind 20­year­old, assuming 
he lives to be 70, would increase his quality 
of life from 40 per cent to 100 per cent for 
50 years, for a total of 30 Qalys. So curing 
the blind person is more valuable, in terms 
of Qalys, than giving drugs to the Aids pat­
ient. Thinking in terms of Qalys makes it 
possible to compare that which seemingly 
cannot be compared: blindness with Aids; 
increases in life expectancy with increases 
in life quality. Qalys free us from the spec­
ificity of people’s lives, giving us a universal 
currency for misery.
However, when deciding what to do – 
what job to get, which charity to donate to, 
whether to buy Fairtrade or not – it isn’t 
enough, according to MacAskill, to think in 
terms of Qalys. We must also think both 
marginally and counterfactually. The idea 
that value should be measured on the 
 margin is familiar from economics; it’s what 
explains the fact that, say, heating repair­
men make more money than childcare work­
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ers. Presumably childcare workers produce 
more total value than heating repairmen, 
but because the supply of childcare work­
ers is greater than the supply of good repair­
men, we will pay more for an additional re­
pairman than an additional childcare work­
er. The average value of a childcare worker 
might be higher than the average value of 
a repairman, but the repairman has the 
greater marginal value. (Another way of put­
ting this: coffee might be really important 
to you, but if you’ve already had three cups 
you’re probably not going to care as much 
about a fourth.) Similarly, MacAskill reas­
ons, when giving money to charity or de­
ciding, say, whether to become a doctor, 
we should focus on marginal rather than 
average value. The average doctor in the de­
veloped world helps save a lot of lives, but 
the marginal doctor – because the supply of 
doctors is large, and most of the life­saving 
work is already covered – doesn’t. The marg­
inal doctor in the developing world has 
greater value, since the supply of doctors is 
lower there. MacAskill estimates that a 
doctor practising in a very poor country 
adds about a hundred times as much marg­
inal value (measured in Qalys) as a doctor 
practising in the UK. (In general, MacAskill 
says, a pound spent in a poor country can 
do one hundred times more good than it 
can in a rich one, a heuristic he calls the 
‘100x Multiplier’.) 
But before signing up for a medical 
 career in sub­Saharan Africa you should be 
careful, MacAskill warns, to evaluate the 
counterfactual. That is, you have to ask your­
self what would happen if you didn’t be­
come a doctor at all. Let’s say that as a 
 doctor in the developing world you’d save 
the equivalent of 300 lives (or 10,950 Qalys, 
at an average 36.5 Qalys per life) over a 40­
year career. Yet if you didn’t take that job, 
someone else probably would; they may 
not save quite as many lives as you, but they 
would save most of them. Meanwhile you 
could quit medicine, take a high­paying 
 finance job and donate most of your salary 
each year to the most effective charities. 
MacAskill estimates that you can expect to 
save a life with $3400 by donating to the 
Against Malaria Foundation, which pro­
vides insecticide­coated bed nets to poor 
families. A financier who worked for 40 years, 
donating $50,000 a year to the Against 
Malaria Foundation, could expect to save 
around 580 lives – lives, significantly, that 
would not have been saved otherwise. Qaly 
thinking frees us from considering the 
specificity of whom we are helping; marg­
inal and counterfactual thinking frees us 
from the specificity of ourselves. What 
matters isn’t who does the good, only that 
good is done.
But don’t many lucrative careers have 
bad social effects? Up until recently Mac­
Askill argued that such effects were moral­
ly irrelevant, again by counterfactual reas­
oning: if you didn’t take the banking job 
someone else would, so the harm would be 
done anyway. (In an academic paper pub­
lished last year, he compares a philanthrop­
ic banker to Oskar Schindler, who provided 
munitions to the Nazis as a means of saving 
the lives of 1200 Jews; if Schindler hadn’t 
manufactured the arms, some other Nazi 
would have, without saving any Jewish lives.) 
More recently MacAskill and his team at 
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80,000 Hours have backed away from this 
‘replaceability thesis’, conceding that it’s 
harder than they initially thought to eval uate 
the counterfactuals. For example, there’s 
good economic reason to think  that going 
into banking really does increase the total 
number of bankers, and doesn’t simply 
change who does the banking.  MacAskill 
says he no longer recommends that people 
go into banking, or at least not the parts of 
it that he thinks cause direct harm: creating 
risks that will be borne by unsuspecting 
taxpayers, or selling pro ducts that no prop­
erly informed person would buy. Instead 
80,000 Hours now encourages people to 
take what it sees as  morally neutral or posit­
ive jobs: quantitative hedge­fund trading, 
management consulting, technology start­
ups. (You can take a careers quiz on the 
80,000 Hours website; I was told to become 
a consultant, because of its earning­to­give 
potential and the gen eral business educ­
ation it provides. When I changed my ans­
wers to say that I was bad at maths I was 
told to go into politics.)
The results of all this number­crunching 
are sometimes satisfyingly counterintuit­
ive. Deworming has better educational out­
comes among Kenyan schoolchildren than 
increasing the numbers of textbooks or 
teachers. If you want to improve animal 
welfare, it’s better to stop eating eggs than 
beef, since caged layer hens live worse lives 
than farmed cows, and because eating eggs 
consumes more animals than eating beef: 
the average American consumes 0.8 layer 
hens but only 0.1 beef cows per year. Buy­
ing Fairtrade goods can be worse than buy­
ing regular goods, since the extra cost goes 
mostly to middlemen rather than farmers, 
and when it doesn’t, it benefits farmers in 
relatively rich countries: because Fairtrade 
standards are hard to meet, most Fairtrade 
coffee production comes from Mexico and 
Costa Rica rather than, say, Ethiopia, where 
the marginal pound would go much fur­
ther. The green value of buying locally 
grown food is overblown, too, since trans­
port accounts for only 10 per cent of the 
carbon footprint of food, while 80 per cent 
of it is generated in production; tomatoes 
grown in the UK can have five times the car­
bon footprint of tomatoes shipped from 
Spain because of the energy required to 
hothouse them. If you’re really committed 
to minimising your carbon footprint, Mac­
Askill recommends donating to the carbon 
offsetting charity Cool Earth; he estimates 
that the average American could offset all 
his carbon emissions by donating $105 a 
year. There isn’t much point in unplugging 
your electricals, either: leaving your mobile 
phone charger plugged in for a whole year 
contributes less to your carbon footprint 
than one hot bath.
Doing Good Better is a feel­good guide to getting good done. It doesn’t dwell much on the horrors 
of global inequality, and sidesteps any dia­
gnosis of its causes. The word ‘oppression’ 
appears just once. This is surely by design, 
at least in part. According to Mac Askill’s 
moral worldview, it is the consequences of 
one’s actions that really matter, and that’s 
as true of writing a book as it is of donating 
to charity. His patter is calculated for max­
imal effect: if the book weren’t so cheery, 
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MacAskill couldn’t expect to inspire as 
much do­gooding, and by his own lights 
that would be a moral failure. (I’m not say­
ing it doesn’t work. Halfway through read­
ing the book I set up a regular donation to 
GiveDirectly, one of the charities Mac Askill 
endorses for its proven efficacy. It gives un­
conditional direct cash transfers to poor 
households in Uganda and Kenya.)
But the book’s snappy style isn’t just a 
strategic choice. MacAskill is evidently com­
fortable with ways of talking that are fam­
iliar from the exponents of global capital­
ism: the will to quantify, the essential 
 comparability of all goods and all evils, the 
obsession with productivity and efficiency, 
the conviction that there is a happy converg­
ence between self­interest and morality, 
the seeming confidence that there is no 
 crisis whose solution is beyond the ingen­
uity of man. He repeatedly talks about phil­
anthropy as a deal too good to pass up: ‘It’s 
like a 99 per cent off sale, or buy one, get 99 
free. It might be the most amazing deal 
you’ll see in your life.’ There is a seemingly 
unanswerable logic, at once natural and 
magical, simple and totalising, to both 
global capitalism and effective altruism. 
That he speaks in the proprietary language 
of the illness – global inequality – whose 
symptoms he proposes to mop up is an 
 irony on which he doesn’t comment. Per­
haps he senses that his potential followers 
– privileged, ambitious millennials – don’t 
want to hear about the iniquities of the 
 system that has shaped their worldview. 
Or perhaps he thinks there’s no irony here 
at all: capitalism, as always, produces the 
means of its own correction, and effective 
altruism is just the latest instance.
Yet there is no principled reason why ef­
fective altruists should endorse the world­
view of the benevolent capitalist. Since ef­
fective altruism is committed to whatever 
would maximise the social good, it might for 
example turn out to support anti­capitalist 
revolution. And although MacAskill focuses 
on health as a proxy for goodness, there is 
no principled reason, as he points out, why 
effective altruism couldn’t also plug values 
like justice, dignity or self­determination 
into its algorithms. (There’s also no reason 
why one couldn’t ‘earn to give’ to help 
 radical causes; Engels worked at a mill in 
Manchester to support Marx’s writing of 
Capital.) Effective altruism has so far been a 
rather homogenous movement of middle­ 
class white men fighting poverty through 
largely conventional means, but it is at 
least in theory a broad church. Indeed one 
element of the movement is turning its at­
tention towards what members like to call 
‘systemic change’, taking up political ad­
vocacy on issues ranging from factory farm­
ing to immigration reform. Even in these 
cases, the numbers are what matter. Mac­
Askill describes how he helped an Oxford 
PPE student work out whether or not she 
should get into electoral politics. He calcul­
ates that historically, the odds of a politic­
ally ambitious Oxford PPE student becom­
ing an MP have been one in thirty (he notes 
that this reflects ‘some disappointing facts 
about political mobility and equal repre­
sentation in the UK’). Applying some con­
servative estimates of the resources an aver­
age MP gets to control, he prices the marg­
inal expected value of the student’s run­
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ning for Parliament at £8 million, which 
turns out to be high enough, compared with 
the expected value of other careers she 
might pursue, to justify the move into pol­
itics. It’s not clear that anyone with less 
conventional political ambitions would get 
the same pass. What’s the expected marg­
inal value of becoming an anti­capitalist 
revolutionary? To answer that you’d need 
to put a value and probability measure on 
achiev ing an unrecognisably different world 
– even, perhaps, on our becoming unrecog­
nisably different sorts of people. It’s hard 
enough to quantify the value of a phil­
anthropic intervention: how would we go 
about quantifying the consequences of  rad­
ically reorganising society?
MacAskill seems to think there is no moral 
calculation that can’t be made to fit on the 
back of his envelope; any uncertainty we 
might have about precise values or prob­
abilities can be priced into the model. (His 
doctoral dissertation was on the model­
ling  of moral uncertainty.) But the more 
uncertain the figures, the less useful the 
calculation, and the more we end up rely­
ing on a commonsense understanding of 
what’s worth doing. Do we really need a 
 sophisticated model to tell us that we 
shouldn’t deal in subprime mortgages, or 
that the American prison system needs fix­
ing, or that it might be worthwhile going 
into electoral politics if you can be confid­
ent you aren’t doing it solely out of self­ 
interest? The more complex the problem 
effective altruism tries to address  – that is, 
the more deeply it engages with the world 
as a political entity – the less distinctive its 
contribution becomes. Effective altruists, 
like everyone else, come up against the fact 
that the world is messy, and like everyone 
else who wants to make it better they must 
do what strikes them as best, without any 
final sense of what that might be or any 
guarantee that they’re getting it right.
More worrying than the model’s inabil­
ity to tell us anything very useful once we 
move outside the circumscribed realm of 
controlled intervention is its susceptibility 
to being used to tell us exactly what we 
want to hear. A three­day conference, ‘Ef­
fective Altruism Global’, was held this sum­
mer at Google’s headquarters in Mountain 
View, California. While some of the ses­
sions focused on the issues closest to Mac­
Askill’s heart – cost­effective philanthropy, 
global poverty, career choice – much of it 
was dominated, according to Dylan Mat­
thews, who was there and wrote about it for 
Vox, by talk of existential risks (or x­risks, as 
the community calls them). An x­risk, as 
defined by the Oxford philosopher Nick Bos­
trom, who popularised the concept, is an 
event that would ‘permanently and drastic­
ally curtail humanity’s potential’ – total 
 annihilation is the obvious case. Given the 
number of people who might live in the 
 future if not for such an event – Bostrom 
 estimates the figure at 1052, assuming that 
we master interstellar travel and the up­
loading of human minds to computers – 
the expected value of preventing an x­risk 
dwarfs the value of, say, curing cancer or 
preventing genocide. This is so even if the 
prob ability of being able to do anything 
about an x­risk is vanishingly small. Even if 
 Bostrom’s 1052 estimate has only a 1 per 
cent chance of being correct, the expected 
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value of reducing an x­risk by one billionth 
of one billionth of a percentage point (that’s 
0.0000000000000000001 per cent) is still a 
hundred billion times greater than the  value 
of saving the lives of a billion people liv­
ing now. So it turns out to be better to try 
 to  prevent some hypothetical x­risk, even 
with an extremely remote chance of being 
able to do so, than to help actual living 
 people. 
X­risks could take many forms – a met­
eor crash, catastrophic global warming, 
plague – but the one that effective altruists 
like to worry about most is the ‘intelligence 
explosion’: artificial intelligence taking over 
the world and destroying humanity. Their 
favoured solution is to invest more money 
in AI research. Thus the humanitarian 
logic of effective altruism leads to the 
 conclusion that more money needs to be 
spent on computers: why invest in anti­ 
malarial nets when there’s a robot apoc­
alypse to halt? It’s no surprise that effective 
altruism is popular in Silicon Valley: PayPal 
founder Peter Thiel, Skype developer Jaan 
Tallinn and Tesla CEO Elon Musk are all 
major financial supporters of x­risk re­
search.* Who doesn’t want to believe that 
their work is of overwhelming humanitar­
ian significance?
The subtitle of Doing Good Better promises 
‘a radical new way to make a difference’; 
one of the organisers of the Googleplex 
conference declared that ‘effective altruism 
could be the last social movement we ever 
need.’ But effective altruism, so far at least, 
has been a conservative movement, calling 
us back to where we already are: the world 
as it is, our institutions as they are. Mac­
Askill does not address the deep sources 
of global misery – international trade and 
finance, debt, nationalism, imperialism, 
racial and gender­based subordination, war, 
environmental degradation, corruption, 
exploitation of labour – or the forces that 
ensure its reproduction. Effective altruism 
doesn’t try to understand how power works, 
except to better align itself with it. In this 
sense it leaves everything just as it is. This 
is no doubt comforting to those who enjoy 
the status quo – and may in part account for 
the movement’s success.
Yet behind MacAskill’s cheery exhort­
ation to invest in anti­malarial nets lies 
a moral philosophy that really is radical. 
In 1972 Peter Singer published his paper 
‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, a classic 
of contemporary utilitarianism, in which he 
compares a Westerner who spends money 
on luxuries rather than don ating it to the 
developing world to some one who walks by 
a drowning child rather than get his clothes 
muddy. We can all agree that the second 
case is morally abhorrent, but not everyone 
has the same qualms about the first. What’s 
the difference? Does it really matter, Singer 
asks, that a child in the developing world is 
thousands of miles away rather than in 
front of us? If not, then all of us who don’t 
merely subsist, who spend money on our­
selves when it would be worth significantly 
more to someone else, are morally im­
plicated in murder, just like the man who 
allows the child to drown. The vast scale of 
global inequality – if your income is more 
than £34,000 per year, adjusted for pur­
chasing power, you’re in the global 1 per 
cent – means that even the smallest lux­
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uries (going to the cinema, a second pair of 
shoes, a drink at the pub) may be morally 
unacceptable.
Effective altruism takes up the spirit of 
Singer’s argument but shields us from the 
full blast of its conclusion; moral indict­
ment is transformed into an empowering 
investment opportunity. Instead of down­
grading our lives to subsistence levels, we 
are encouraged to start with the traditional 
tithe of 10 per cent, then do a bit more each 
year. Thus effective altruism dodges one of 
the standard objections to utilitarianism: 
that it asks too much of us. But it isn’t clear 
how the dodge is supposed to work. Mac­
Askill tells us that effective altruists – like 
utilitarians – are committed to doing the 
most good possible, but he also tells us that 
it’s OK to enjoy a ‘cushy lifestyle’, so long 
as you’re donating a lot to charity. Either 
 effective altruism, like utilitarianism, de­
mands that we do the most good possible, 
or it asks merely that we try to make things 
better. The first thought is genuinely radic­
al, requiring us to overhaul our daily lives 
in ways unimaginable to most. (Singer re­
peats his call for precisely such an overhaul 
in his recent book The Most Good You Can Do, 
and Larissa MacFarquhar’s Strangers Drown-
ing is a set of portraits of ‘extreme altruists’ 
who have answered the call.†) The second 
thought – that we try to make things better 
– is shared by every plausible moral system 
and every decent person. If effective altru­
ism is simply in the business of getting us 
to be more effective when we try to help 
others, then it’s hard to object to it. But in 
that case it’s also hard to see what it’s offer­
ing in the way of fresh moral insight, still 
less how it could be the last social move­
ment we’ll ever need.
A more pressing objection to utilit­arianism is not that it demands too much, but that it demands the 
wrong things, the things that constitute us 
as humans: our personal attachments, loy­
alties and ident ifications. On the utilitarian 
view, a pound spent without maximal effect 
is a pound spent immorally. Luxuries are 
naturally rul ed out, but so is spending on 
worthwhile causes to which you might feel 
some person al affinity. Here MacAskill 
agrees: to choose to donate to a relatively 
cost­ineffective charity just because it’s 
close to your heart – the local soup kitchen, 
or a seeing­eye dog charity in honour of a 
blind relative (it costs £32,400 to train one 
seeing­eye dog and its owner) – is wrong. 
How far should the effective altruist go 
with this logic? If you’re faced with the 
choice between spend ing a few hours con­
soling a bereaved friend, or earning some 
money to donate to an effective charity, the 
utilitar ian calcul us will tell you to do the 
latter. If effective altruists really are com­
mitted to doing the most good, they should 
say the same. If however they are merely 
committed to doing a lot of good, then they 
will say that you can stay with your friend so 
long as you’re doing sufficient good else­
where. But even this more moderate view 
misconceives the situation. You should stay 
and console your friend not because you’ve 
already met your do­gooding quota, but be­
cause it’s your friend that is in distress. This 
is also the reason you shouldn’t deal in sub­
prime mortgages or make money from the 
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exploitation of labour, even if the good ef­
fects would outweigh the bad: it’s your life, 
and it matters, morally speaking, what you 
do with it, and not just – as Mac Askill sug­
gests – what is done because of it.
That emphasis on ‘your’ is something that 
utilitarians often find conceptually mystify­
ing, or at least a moral distraction. Here, 
for example, is MacAskill talking about his 
visit to the Hamlin Fistula Hospital in 
 Addis Ababa, and his later decision not to 
donate to its main charitable benefactor:
I’d hugged the women who suffered from this 
condition, and they’d thanked me for visiting 
them. It had been an important experience 
for me: a vivid first­hand demonstration of 
the severity of the problems in the world. 
This was a cause I had a personal connection 
with. Should I have donated to the Fistula 
Foundation, even knowing I could do more 
to help people if I donated elsewhere? I do 
not think so. If I were to give to the Fistula 
Foundation rather than to charities I thought 
were more effective, I would be privileging the 
needs of some people over others for emo­
tional rather than moral reasons. That would 
be unfair to those I could have helped more. 
If I’d visited some other shelter in Ethiopia, 
or in any other country, I would have had a 
different set of personal connections. It was 
arbitrary that I’d seen this particular problem 
at close quarters.
That word ‘arbitrary’ is striking. It is indeed 
arbitrary that MacAskill went to this hosp­
ital and not another, in Ethiopia and not 
some other country, just as it is arbitrary 
that we have the family, friends, lovers and 
neighbours we do. But doesn’t such arbi­
trariness come to mean something else, 
ethically speaking, when it is constitutive 
of our personal experience: when it be­
comes embedded in the complex structure 
of commitments, affinities and understand­
ings that comprise social life? We might 
even think that the arbitrariness of time 
and place is transformed into something 
else, ethically speaking, through the ex­
change of a fleeting hug or thanks. What’s 
more, MacAskill’s talk of fairness is too 
easy. It is no doubt unfair that some of 
the world’s worst off are helped while oth­
ers aren’t. But isn’t it just as unfair that the 
Ethiopian women MacAskill met are vic­
tims of a debilitating condition that is too 
costly to be ‘worth’ funding? And what of 
the victims of austerity or rising inequality 
in the first world? MacAskill’s reminder 
that these people are still among the world’s 
richest is cold comfort (it also obscures 
what all those trampled by the ruling class 
everywhere may have in common).
When MacAskill says that helping the 
Ethiopian women he met would be ‘arbi­
trary’ and ‘unfair’, he means to speak from 
what the 19th­century utilitarian Henry Sidg­
wick called ‘the point of view of the uni­
verse’. But in so doing MacAskill is try­
ing to step outside what is unavoidably the 
scene of ethical action: one’s own point of 
view. MacAskill thinks this self­transcend­
ence – or as close as we non­saints can get 
to it – is essential if we are going to meet the 
ethical demands of our day. Wittingly or 
not, he believes, we are all like A&E doc­
tors, forced to perform triage lest more 
people suffer and die than have to. What is 
required is impersonal, ruthless decision­ 
making, heart firmly reined in by the head. 
This is not our everyday sense of the ethical 
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life; such notions as responsibility, kind­
ness, dignity and moral sensitivity will have 
to be radically reimagined if they are to sur­
vive the scrutiny of the universal gaze. But 
why think this is the right way round? Per­
haps it is the universal gaze that cannot 
withstand our ethical scrutiny.
There is a small paradox in the growth of 
effective altruism as a movement when it is 
so profoundly individualistic. Its utilitarian 
calculations presuppose that everyone else 
will continue to conduct business as usual; 
the world is a given, in which one can make 
careful, piecemeal interventions. The tacit 
assumption is that the individual, not the 
community, class or state, is the proper ob­
ject of moral theorising. There are benefits 
to thinking this way. If everything comes 
down to the marginal individual, then our 
ethical ambitions can be safely circumscrib­
ed; the philosopher is freed from the  bur den 
of trying to understand the mess we’re in, 
or of proposing an alternative  vision of how 
things could be. The philo sopher is left to 
theorise only the auto nomous man, the 
world a mere background for his righteous 
choices. You wouldn’t be blamed for hoping 
that philosophy has more to give. c
